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Abstract 
Australia has had unfortunate experience in industrial cluster development, and despite widespread 
government action remains below OECD averages  in terms of cluster contribution to economic wealth. 
We use Porter’s cluster theory to examine the contrary case: the  highly successful Tasmanian Light Ships 
Cluster, to determine the roles of government, chance and local culture in cluster success. We conclude 
that cluster development is a dynamic process. Governments should only provide infrastructure  support 
and only this for new ideas that fall within the scope of local knowledge, and existing chance related 
entrepreneurial activity.  
 
Introduction 
Since the 1980s,  globalisation of Australia’s markets and associated reforms to the economy presented 
significant economic challenges for the country’s federal and state governments.  Of particular concern to 
legislators was (and remains) the question as to how to make a nation previously protected by a ‘fortress’ 
of tariffs and subsidies, more productive and competitive on world markets (Brown, 2000).  One concept 
that was adopted as a prominent economic development model by Australian governments in the 1990s 
was Porter’s (1990) theory of ‘industrial clustering’ (Ivarsson, 1999).  It was generally accepted by 
Australian governments that the conditions leading to the formation of internationally recognised 
‘clusters’ of industry (such as Silicon Valley in the United States) could be replicated to help foster the 
growth of new industries, and to re-engineer older industries to world standards (Ivarsson, 1999; Lloyd & 
Dicken, 1990). 
 
This belief  was manifest in the Australian Manufacturing Report (Pappas, Carter, Evens, Koop & Telesis, 
1990) which introduced the Porterian concept of ‘industrial cluster development’ into governmental 
policy development by proposing regional industry partnerships to strengthen networks, encourage 
innovation and development, and technology transfer.  In particular, the notions of ‘networking and 
innovation’ emerged as important platforms of public policy to integrate Australian industries more into 
global business structures (Australian Manufacturing Council, 1994; Bureau of Industry Economics, 
1991).  Further to this, in 1993, a federal government taskforce on regional development investigated the 
development potential of regions within Australia (Kelty, 1993).  This was followed by the McKinsey 
Report “Lead Local, Compete Global” (McKinsey & Company, 1994) which was the first report to 
explicitly suggest clustering as a basis of industry and economic development.  Working Nation (Keating, 
1994) policies and other initiatives by state and federal governments led to investigations and the 
implementation of policies to facilitate the development of clustering as a means of stimulating regional 
industry and economic development in Australia. 
    
Industrial Cluster Development: The Australian experience 
Of particular note in the economic literature however, is the fact that despite the widespread adoption of 
industrial cluster policy by the federal and state governments, Australia remains below the OECD average 
in terms of its clusters’ economic contributions to real wealth creation (Brown, 2000; Enright & Roberts, 
2001).  This ‘below average’ performance has been largely attributed to a lack of awareness and in-depth 
understanding regarding the different cluster processes and typologies that exist in the literature, the 
benefits available from them, and how government policy development impacts on other economic 
initiatives (Enright & Roberts, 2001; OECD, 1998).  Indeed, Brown (2000) goes so far as to suggest that 
 
Australia’s below average performance is largely predicated on the inexperience of legislators, the spatial 
effects of the country’s vast landmass and relatively low population, and the “very confused role of 
government” (Brown, 2000: 13).  
 
To further compound Australian efforts to implement the ‘lessons’ of Porter’s (1990) ICT were several 
scholarly advances which suggested that the theory was not specifically able to advance national 
development, but rather only ‘firm development’ (Yetton, Craig, Davis & Hilmer, 1992).  Additionally, 
authors such as Brown (2000) and Enright & Roberts (2001) suggested that the theory was largely 
retrospective in nature, and unable to aid the post-hoc development of national economies.   Porter’s 
(1990) theory has been updated to account for these observations (see Porter, 1998a; 1998b; 2001a; 
2001b) but there still seems to be further work required to apply its tenets to regional economies, such as 
the majority of those in Australia (Enright & Roberts, 2001).  Given this opportunity there appears to be 
three main theoretical issues that arise from the Australian ‘industrial cluster development’ experience.  
The first issue surrounds the question as to what the appropriate governmental role in industrial cluster 
development actually is, and indeed what it is that constitutes the ‘government’ as an actor.  The second 
issue relates to the government’s role in supporting the regional economy’s pool of entrepreneurs.  The 
third issue surrounds the notion of ‘chance events’, and whether chance events can be incorporated into a 
government’s cluster development policies. 
 
In order to improve our understanding of the clustering process and its value in regional economic 
development in Australia, this paper will undertake an examination of one of Australia’s most successful 
industry clusters, that of the Tasmanian Light Ship Industry (TLSI).  The TLSI comprises of five ‘core’ 
firms – International Catamarans (Incat), Colbeck and Gunton, Skeels and Perkins, Liferaft Systems, and 
Riley Industrial and Marine Sales, along with five other ‘peripheral’ or ‘support’ organisations (Industry 
Audit, 1998).  The value of the TLSI to the regional Tasmanian economy (and indeed to the Australian 
economy as a whole) is without question.  During the period 1979 to 1999, the TLSI has grown 
substantially, generating an annual turnover of some AUD$250 million, directly employing approximately 
1 500 people (about 80% of the state industry’s total), and indirectly employing approximately 1 000 
others.  Indeed, the TLSI boasts the world’s leading manufacturer of high-speed ferries, Incat, which has 
managed to capture approximately 40 percent of the world’s passenger ferry market (Hanson et.al. 2002).  
This particular industry is useful because it has proved to be one of the world’s best performing industrial 
clusters in terms of market share gained relative to the nation’s average. It also emphasises the role that 
chance plays in cluster development, and illustrates the significance to cluster development  of ‘cultural 
understanding’ and government infrastructure provisions after the entrepreneur has initiated their business 
strategy.  
 
A brief discussion of Porter’s (1990) Industrial Cluster Theory (ITC) 
In his book The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990), Porter develops the notion of industrial 
clusters as part of a framework known as the ‘diamond of national competitive advantage’, which 
attempts to define the set of interrelated factors that result in the competitive success of national industries 
(eg. Silicon Valley in the USA). Porter’s ICT suggests that a nation’s industry will be internationally 
successful if a synergistic interrelationship exists between four important variables: ‘factor conditions’, 
‘local demand conditions’, ‘related and supporting industries’, and ‘firm strategy, structure and rivalry’ 
(see Figure 1).  
 
Factor conditions refer to any primary inputs required by the firm, that is, the basic factors of production 
such as land, labour and capital, human resources, and infrastructure, which are necessary conditions to 
compete in an industry (Porter, 1990). Local demand conditions can influence the development of a 
competitive industry by ensuring that clustered firms focus on differing and increasingly more 
sophisticated consumer preferences, be it at the government, firm or individual level (Porter, 1990).  As 
the diamond model is based upon the success of a nation’s produce in international markets, only those 
 
products that have performed well in their own domestic markets can provide a nation with a competitive 
advantage. Sophisticated and discerning consumers are considered particularly important, as they drive 
the need for quality and high standards of innovation along with the development of new products, 
leading to enhanced market competitiveness.  The public sector has an equally important role to play, both 
as a demanding customer itself, and an establisher of rigid standards concerning a firm’s safety, its 
product quality, and its environmental impact (Porter, 1990).  
 
Related and supporting industries refer to those industries within an economy that share common 
technologies, factor inputs, distribution channels, customers, activities and/or provide products that are 
complementary in nature (Porter, 1990).  Linkages between industries constitute the nexus around which 
Porter’s (1990) notion of ‘industrial clusters’ are formed. The more ‘effective’ the related and supporting 
industries are in an economy, the greater the value of the technologies, ideas and human capital 
development that may ensue within the economy, and the better able industries are in benefiting from 
these positive externalities (Porter, 1990).  Firm strategy, structure and rivalry also fosters the growth of 
national industries, and are seen as an impetus for increased competitiveness as they create pressure for 
firms to improve their local competitiveness and innovativeness (Porter, 1990).  According to Porter’s 
(1990) model, rigorous domestic competition helps ensure a precondition for success in international 
markets, as it forces firms to innovate and prevents them from relying merely on an abundance of natural 
resources, or protection via government intervention policies.  
 
Of the four factors, Porter (1990) suggests that two in particular, the ‘intensity of domestic rivalry’ and the 
nature of its ‘related and supporting industries’, are considered of utmost importance in the development 
of industry clusters that are internationally competitive, and therefore able to generate real economic 
growth.   Porter (1990) theorised that a nation will be particularly competitive in those industries where 
‘clusters’ of related and supporting industries are geographically concentrated, allowing their interactions 
to be more complementary and far more dynamic than they might be otherwise.  Simultaneously, the 
intensity of the domestic rivalry between firms promotes the upgrading of the entire ‘cluster system’, 
while geographical concentration increases the intensity of interactions within that system (Baptista, 
1996).  A cluster of firms that draws on common specialised inputs and infrastructure should upgrade 
local factor quality and increase its supply.  In a similar fashion, intense rivalry and geographical 
concentration should also have positive effects on the composition and size of local demand, and also on 
the existence and development of related and supporting industries, particularly specialised suppliers and 
users (Porter, 1990).  Geographical concentration is of foremost importance for organisational 
improvement and technological innovation.  Universities and other research centres, customers and 
suppliers that are close together are best placed to exchange ideas and co-operate in industry research 
(Porter, 1990). As such, the Porterian Clusters are often characterised as agglomerations of similar firms 
that together are able to achieve synergies in their operations; therefore the greater the rivalry (and indeed 
support) inherent to the cluster relationships, the greater the expected relative quality, quantity, and 
profitability of the cluster’s output. 
 
In addition, Porter’s (1990) model incorporates the moderating roles of ‘historical precedence’, ‘chance 
events’ and ‘government’ in determining the success (or otherwise) of a nation’s industrial clusters, and 
therefore, its competitive advantage. Chance events can play a major role in the creation (and indeed 
destruction) of industrial clusters.  Chance occurrences can lead to a chain of events that trigger the 
growth of an industry cluster, for example, the partial destruction of Hobart’s Tasman Bridge in 1975 
resulted in the ‘exponential growth’ of a local marine transportation industry, which, in turn, helped 
establish Australia’s currently successful shipbuilding industry. Porter (1990) suggests that the second 
moderating variable, the ‘role of government’ is of equally significant importance to the development and 
maintenance of a nation’s competitive advantage.  Porter argues that the government’s actions and policy 
directions have a direct (and/or indirect) influence on each the four ‘diamond factors’.  Governments, 
according to Porter (1990) are able, and therefore required, to provide the appropriate economic 
 
conditions that allow an industry cluster to realise the agglomeration benefits that may be available to it, 
and in doing so present ‘economic challenges’ to the cluster to generate growth through continued 
innovation.  To do more than this is to render the cluster weak and open to decay.  
 
The Tasmanian Light Ship Industry – A Porterian analysis 
Historical Precedence and the ‘Diamond Factors’: 
Tasmania has a long history of building both boats and ships.. Aboriginal inhabitants were sufficiently 
skilled in boat building for their craft to navigate the treacherous seas around Maatsuyker Island where 
different tribes met each summer. craft, self-built, using twisted bark as The first trading vessel recorded 
as being launched on the Derwent was the Henrietta Packett in 1812, a 40 tonne schooner. More regular 
building began in the 1820s with the construction of thirty to one hundred tonne vessels for the coastal 
trade. Four main centres of activity developed: at Launceston, at Hobart, on the Huon, and at the penal 
settlements, first Macquarie Harbour and later at Port Arthur. 1836 saw the beginning of an expansion in 
both the number and size of vessels being built.  The colonial builders began to construct vessels large 
enough to take their place on the Australia-England route. Between 1838 and 1848, 107 vessels were 
built. During this time, Hobart was producing more ships than the remaining Australian colonies 
combined. Shipbuilding costs were lower in Tasmania than on the mainland and the availability and 
excellence of the native timber allowed the industry to boom.  The advent of steel-hulled sailing vessels 
on the major international sailing routes saw the industry decline in Tasmania during the second half of 
the 19th century. During the early decades of the twentieth century, employment in ship building in 
Tasmania averaged 65 persons. During the 1930s this had slipped to an average of 35 with most ships 
servicing the State having been constructed overseas. 
 
World War II saw the resurgence of shipbuilding in both the private shipyards and in the newly 
established government yard at Prince of Wales Bay. The government yard constructed wooden-hulled 
cargo vessels to 600 tonnes and at its peak employed more than 600 men. Private yards at Battery Point 
and on the Tamar built shallow-draft hospital vessels and harbour defence motor launches. After the surge 
of activity associated with the war effort, the industry again declined and stabilised at a level 
commensurate with servicing the local demand for fishing vessels and other craft. The 1980s saw the 
emergence of companies successfully concentrating their activities on innovative designs and export 
markets. These pioneering developments culminated during the 1990s in the attainment of world 
leadership in the design and manufacture of a new generation of fast passenger ferries. 
 
Tasmania’s Light Ship Industry and the ‘Role of Chance’: 
During the early 1970’s, there had been some talk of a reintroduction of a ‘Trans-Derwent’ ferry service, 
one that would predominantly serve Tasmania’s tourist population.  As had happened with the sinking of a 
rival’s vessel some four years earlier, Robert Clifford, an experienced fisherman, sensed an opportunity to 
employ his entrepreneurial skill and capture a new market. In 1972 he and his father formed the Sullivan’s 
Cove Ferry Company on the Derwent River. ( this and subsequent Incat material is from Wickham and 
Hanson 2002) .So keen had Clifford been that simultaneously, he also approached the Marine 
Construction Company (a boat building venture in Rokeby, Hobart) with some preliminary design plans 
for his proposed ‘Derwent River ferry’.  As with the boats the two had previously built, Clifford was keen 
to have production underway nearly immediately, and in fact, the details of the ferry’s design was 
‘worked out by the builder and Clifford as construction progressed’.   By mid 1972, construction of 
Clifford’s first ferry, the 20-metre steel-hulled ‘Matthew Brady’ was completed. Armed with a suitable 
vessel to handle a ferry service across the Derwent River, all that the Sullivan’s Cove Ferry Company had 
to accomplish was a successful bid for the rights to service the market.  The father and son combination 
was eventually successful in their bid, and began operations late in 1972.   
 
Business proved to be good in the early stages of the newly formed ferry service, with both tourists and 
locals taking advantage of this novel attraction.  In order for Clifford to generate sales growth, and indeed 
 
protect his source of income, he prudently decided to build a second ferry in case the Matthew Brady was 
unable to sail.  A second ferry was designed, commissioned and built in 1973 .Technologies had improved 
since the construction of the Matthew Brady, and as such the new ferry was actually somewhat faster and 
more comfortable than the mother ship. On the 5th January, 1975 at 9:27 p.m., the bulk ore carrier ‘Lake 
Illawarra’ crashed into the 19th pier of the Tasman Bridge, claiming twelve lives, and severing the Eastern 
Shore’s link with Hobart by knocking out an 80 metre section of the bridge. Many tens of thousands of 
motorists and cyclists were now unable to travel easily to their required destinations, be it for work or 
pleasure.   Bob Clifford found himself in the enviable position of ‘being in the right place at the right 
time’. 
 
The Role of the Entrepreneur in Regional Economic Development: 
In response to the increased demand for transport, which resulted from the Tasman Bridge tragedy, 
Clifford hurriedly built a third ferry, the ‘Martin Cash’.  Such was the priority of the project that “records 
were broken in the rush to get the crafty into service quickly”.  The construction process was aided 
somewhat by the fact that the new ferry was a sister ship to the original Matthew Brady, and therefore no 
new designs or alterations were required.   
Although the ferry service now boasted three boats, demand still exceeded supply, and in late 1975 a 
fourth ferry was commissioned.  Given the urgency of demand in the market, the latest ferry, the 
‘Lawrence Kavanagh’ was constructed in record time.  
 
The ferries transported nine million passengers and  provided Clifford with significant revenues, but not 
the entire fortune came from the sale of transport tickets alone.  Indeed, after finding a loophole in the 
Tasmanian Licensing Laws, Clifford was able to serve both counter meals and alcoholic beverages on his 
ferry rides, even though he did not possess what the law required – a dedicated dining area.  It would 
appear that the lawmakers of the day had not considered the possibility that a ferry service would 
undertake such additional services. At its zenith, Clifford’s ‘bushranger fleet’ was the largest licensee in 
Australia, averaging sales of 3800 litres of beer per week; the sales from beer and food were so great that 
they accounted for more than 50% of the entire revenues generated by the business. 
 
In order to improve customer service and increase the business’ revenues, Clifford hired a new British-
built ‘fast ferry’, the ‘Michael Howe’.  The Howe was twice as fast and twice as comfortable as the 
‘bushranger fleet’ owned by Clifford, and was an instant success with the general public.  Unfortunately, 
the Michael Howe was also a maintenance intensive investment, with 75 percent of all company 
maintenance expenditure spent on the new ‘hired hand’. Clifford was understandably unimpressed with 
the boat’s design and maintenance requirements, despite the public’s obvious delight with the faster 
service. The flaws that Clifford observed in the boat’s design and structure (ie. the mechanics were far too 
complicated and labour intensive to be viable ion the long-term) once again re-ignited his innovative flair: 
“If the English can sell 34 heaps of rubbish like this [around the world], how many properly engineered 
fast ships could we sell from Tasmania?”  And with this marketing opportunity well in his grasp, the 
Clifford business began its initial foray into the fast-ferry industry. 
 
The question for Clifford now concerned how to develop a boat with the speed and the passenger appeal 
of a fast-moving vessel (eg. a hovercraft), yet maintain the basic economies of a conventional ferry.  
Clifford studied the merits of numerous low-resistance hovercrafts, and the catamaran-style ‘sidewall’ 
hovercraft was chosen as the best available design template.  Clifford utilised this hovercraft design, but 
altered it to include twin-hulls (somewhat wider that the norm for catamarans at the time) and to exclude 
the ‘air-lift equipment’ standard to the hovercraft altogether.  The newly designed boat was described as 
‘thought provoking’ by naval engineering experts, and indeed, the prototype model was not sanctioned by 
the maritime authorities as a ‘legal means for general public transportation’.  This rejection was primarily 
due to a recent change in maritime law in Tasmania.   
 
 
Under new legislation, Clifford (and every other boat manufacturer) was forced to seek the services of a 
qualified naval architect to endorse any new design – a time consuming and rather expensive task given 
that no such professional practiced in the state at the time.   In order to get the required endorsement, 
Clifford had to travel to New South Wales, to meet a certified naval architect, Phil Hercus, who resided in 
Sydney.  The plans were  then approved.The ‘Jeremiah Ryan’ was built in a Tasmanian government 
owned ‘wharf shed’ at Prince of Wales Bay in September 1977, and according to Clifford, it could only 
have been described as ‘ugly as sin’.  Construction was undertaken by collaboration between Clifford 
employees and a number of contracted ‘expert’ tradesmen.  Although not as pretty as Clifford may have 
liked, the steel catamaran was a considered a major breakthrough, achieving some 26 knots in initial 
speed trials, considerably more than the 18 originally hoped for in the design stage.  After this success of 
Clifford and Hercus entered into a partnership to form International Catamarans Pty Ltd of Australia 
(Incat).  
 
Incat, buoyed by the success of their original catamaran design and construction, continued to employ 
innovative design and construction processes.  To achieve this end, the company restructured its 
management team, which now ‘professionally employed’ the functional services of an ‘offshore project 
manager’ (Mr. Graeme Freeman) and the strategic services of three ‘company directors’ (Mr. R. Clifford, 
Mr. P. Hercus and Mr. K. Sturmey).   
 
By 1979, in an effort to reduce the weight of their boats, the company ‘did away’ with the traditional 
steel-based catamaran designs in favour of an experiment with aluminium super-structures.  The first 
steel-aluminium catamaran to be sold by Incat was the ‘James Kelly’ in June of 1979, and served to ferry 
passengers across Macquarie Harbour.  The project was considered ‘highly important’, as it was the initial 
foray into new shipbuilding technologies and processes, the most important of which is arguably the 
‘perfection of aluminium-based welding’. However radical the design and building processes were, the 
end result was that the operators found the ferry to be much faster and cheaper to run than traditional ferry 
designs.  Consequently, the operators considered the James Kelly a great success. The commercial success 
of the James Kelly soon became the talk of the maritime industry, and resulted in the first orders for ‘all 
aluminium’ catamarans.   
 
In keeping with the innovative nature of the business to date, Clifford was only too happy to attempt this 
new ‘all-aluminium’ catamaran.  The lighter and more aesthetically pleasing vessel also proved to be a 
great success for the purchasers, and very popular with their customers.  Clifford comments that with this 
first effort (eventually named the ‘Fitzroy’) “We had overcome our fear of the unknown and built an 
excellent aluminium vessel at out first try”.   Clifford also learnt an important marketing lesson: A fast 
ship must look fast!  In an effort to impress Incat’s customer, the delivery voyage was used as an 
opportunity to show off the tremendous speed the boat had to offer.  So impressed were the customers by 
the speed at which their new boat arrived that they immediately ordered five more similar vessels on the 
spot.  Positive word of mouth soon followed, as did orders from all over Australia and from around the 
world. 
 
Clifford was effective because he worked from existing knowledge deeply embedded in the Tasmanian 
culture. He took advantage of chance events and created a successful firm that set cluster development 
going. The shipping emphasis meant that a workforce with basic understanding of the challenges of the 
industry was available and that basic foreshore infrastructure could readily be created. 
   
Analysis - The Roles of Regional Government and Culture 
The theoretical role of any government, be it state or federal, is to provide an economic climate that 
supports the evolution and growth of the Porterian Diamond Factors (Porter, 1998).  In essence, this 
suggests that governments are required to support the growth of each of the four diamond factors outlined 
above.  As noted in the Nixon Report (Foster & Nixon, 1998) however, regional governments are far less 
 
able to influence the development of all the factors inherent to the diamond model than are federal 
governments, or those in major economic centres (such as Melbourne, Sydney or Brisbane).   Of 
particular concern to regional governments is their lack of international business expertise; the low 
taxation base from which they draw revenue; the fact that federal policies aimed at controlling the major 
economic centres have a greater impact at the regional level (Foster & Nixon, 1998).  In addition to these 
issues, the regional government of Tasmania has some specific concerns of its own, and includes a highly 
decentralised and declining population; and its distance from Australian markets, let alone international 
ones.   
 
Theoretically, the regional government has to attempt to achieve the same regional outcomes (in terms of 
supporting the diamond factors) as do federal and major economic centre government, but with far less 
resources and less expertise.  In terms of the TLSI, the state government’s major contributions to the 
cluster’s development were in terms of identifying skills shortages and providing a training centre (TAFE) 
focused on aluminium welding courses.  The government also lobbied the federal government to continue 
the Shipbuilding Bounty throughout the 1990s, which at various times had been threatened under an 
international convention.  The TLSI members were also provided with land such that hey could physically 
cluster in a close geographical location, and were given tax breaks and grants for training and research 
and development.  Most recently, the Tasmanian government went so far as to purchase equity in a new 
shipbuilding precinct in the state’s south (valued at some $800K) and ‘loan’ the Incat company some $30 
million in order to overcome what was called a short-term ‘cash flow crisis’.  
 
The Tasmanian government was successful in providing training and other basic but expensive 
infrastructure after the industry had started. This was not a government led cluster but one led by a 
culturally appropriate idea and entrepreneur. Much other Australian experience of cluster development 
has been unfortunate because of failure to follow the TLSI path, for example the ‘multi function polis’ of 
the 1990’s was a famous failure, amongst other reasons, because the government role was overplayed. 
Government is most successful when it stays at a distance, but is willing to provide expensive 
infrastructure within the scope of ‘chance’, the ideas of the  entrepreneur who takes advantage of chance 
events and the ‘culture’ of the region.  
 
In the case of the TLSI, cultural understanding provided the boundaries that scope internationally 
successful regional clusters. This idea of scope encompasses the appropriate role for government and the 
use of chance events.  In the TLSI it was the specific knowledge of Tasmania’s shipbuilding culture 
possessed by Clifford and his network of contacts that helped to drive the ‘new’ industry toward 
international success.  The chance event was significant because it initiated responses that fell within the 
scope of the state’s shipbuilding knowledge. N The TLSI example suggests that not all ‘chance events’ are 
significant only those that fit within cultural understandings contingent on time and place.  
 
Conclusion 
Industry clustering is a dynamic process that must be learned and cultivated by both federal and state 
governments, although there is still much to be learned about the nature, means and benefits of clustering 
in supporting regional and local economic development (Enright & Roberts, 2001). It appears important 
that regional economic policymakers learn how to identify and build the national and regional strategic 
architecture to support the development of industry clusters. The challenge facing Australia is how to 
apply the lessons learned from this brief exploration of industry clustering in setting future strategic 
directions and initiatives that will strengthen the capacity of entrepreneurs, their firms, and indeed 
industries in regions to develop and compete for new business, trade, investment and employment 
opportunities.  The new role for the regional government may be that it should not attempt to merely 
‘bankroll’ new ideas when developing policies for economic growth.  Instead it should provide money for 
that infrastructure which promotes new ideas that fall within a region’s ‘cultural knowledge’ and that have 
entrepreneurs that are already pursuing the opportunity in the region.  It is important then, that the 
 
 adoption of new technologies and policies should be undertaken through the lens of the existing cultural 
knowledge and capabilities. 
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